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monograph are irrelevant or i l l- 
confused.  Their volumetric ana ly t i c  
method  is inadequate and their 
approach to the platform/wel ls 
locat ion quest ion  conf l ic ts  w i th  oi l  
industry views. On the economic 
aspects, Wal l  et al avoid the central 
issue we considered - on how to 
resolve company-government  
conf l ic t  - and instead take  up an 
issue - on the overall speed of North  
Sea development - which we did 
not discuss. We show, moreover, 
how th is  c r i t i c i sm of our study is 
largely unsubstantiated personal 
opinion and, as such, unworthy of 
consideration, even if many  of Wal l  
et a/'s arguments  were  not  
erroneous. 
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3 Professor Odell has been appointed as a 
consultant to the UK Department of 
Energy to study and report on this, 
Wall et al have produced a critique I of our monograph on the optimal 
development of the North Sea's oilfields 2 which totally ignores the 
essential theme of the study. This is that government and company 
interests in the development of large, off-shore oilfields are different, 
but that, despite this, governments have both the opportunity and the 
option to modify the economic environment within which the 
companies must operate. The companies can thus be persuaded to act 
in the nation's best interest, without the modification adversely 
affecting their commercial interests. Even if the severe criticisms of 
our work presented by Wall et a! were correct (and we do not believe 
this to be the case), this essential point which has emerged from our 
research remains valid. 
The critique is in two distinct parts - on reservoir calculations and 
engineering aspects, and on the economics. This division of the article 
is one of its main weaknesses, for the engineering and economic 
aspects of off-shore optimal development decisions are so interrelated 
that it is impossible, as we tried to show in our monograph, to deal 
separately with the issues involved. Indeed, it seems to be the absence 
of early and sufficiently comprehensive economic components in 
evaluations of an oilfield's recoverable reserves (particularly viewed 
from the national viewpoint rather than that of the company which 
has discovered the reservoir) that has already led to production plans 
for North Sea fields which appear to be far from optimal from the 
British taxpayer's point of view. In as far as our monograph appears 
to have stimulated interest by the UK Department of Energy in the 
national aspects of the economics of reservoir development (to 
complement i s existing technical interest in reservoir engineering), 
perhaps we may already fairly claim a useful result from our efforts to 
hypothesize nationally optimal development approaches to North Sea 
oil production. 3 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the symbiotic 
relationship between the engineering and economic aspects of North 
Sea oilfield development in the context of important national as well 
as company interests, we are obliged in this rejoinder to react to the 
separate - and apparently independent - - efforts of Wall and Wilson 
on engineering and Jones on economics. 
Engineering aspects 
On the size of reservoirs 
Wall et al point out that we consulted with experts in the field of 
analysis outside our direct technical competence - the field of 
reservoir engineering. Indeed we did, and we wonder why Professor 
Wall, one of the experts consulted, has changed his opinion so 
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radically since he reviewed an earlier draft of our work and discussed 
it with us at length. On that occasion he expressed general approval of 
our methods, and while raising detailed points, such as issues of 'over 
drilling', his opinion on the work as a whole was that 'a more 
sophisticated model of the reservoir would change the results by only 
about five per cent'. 4 We are left pondering what changes in 
circumstances and/or what external pressures could have produced 
Wall's remarkable volte-face. 
Wall et al assert that much of our alleged error in our volumetric 
calculations on reservoir size is due to a mistake in the term (1-SwB) 
in the equation we used for estimating oil in place) This is impossible, 
for we use no such term anywhere in our monograph. Much of the 
credibility of the argument against us collapses imply because of this 
falsification of our work. Where we do use a similar term, (1-Bo, Sw.), 
we clearly state, in our definition of terms, that BoiS ~ represents'a 
. . . . .  ' /  
single estimate representmg two pieces of data which are not available 
to the public: As we use an estimate for this term, it is self-evident 
that no mathematical manipulation of the term is possible - or indeed 
involved. The long and tedious explanation 7 as to why we should have 
divided rather than multiplied is therefore splendidly irrelevant. 
*Discussions held on 10 June 1976 on 
Odell and Rosing, 'Optimal development 
of large North Sea oil fields', Series A 
Working Papers No 76-8, Economic 
Geography Institute, Rotterdam, 1976; 
see also the acknowledgment in Odell 
and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, p 9. 
s Wall et al, °Pc i t ,  Ref 1, p 286, lines 43- 
46. 
Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, p 62. 
Wall et al, op cit, Ref 1, pp 285-287. 
8/bid, p 285, paragraph 4. 
9 Ibid, p 285, Table 1. 
1o/bid, p 284, paragraph 4. 
11 B.C. Craft and M.F. Hawkins, Appl ied  
Petroleum Engineering, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N J, 1959. The method 
involves measuring the area contained 
within each contour interval of producing 
sands. The area within the lowest contour 
is then multiplied by its height above the 
water-oil contact line. The area lying in 
each successively higher contour is 
multiplied by the contour interval to give a 
series of bulk volumes. Finally these are 
added to give the total bulk volume (see 
Craft and Hawkins, pp 27-28). 
12 We divided the surface of the field into 
small hexagons, identified the mid-point 
of each of these, and interpolated from 
the contour information the average 
height of each hexagon across the field 
(see Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, pp 
60-61). The volume of each hexagonally 
shaped column was calculated by 
multiplying its height above the oil-water 
contact level by the area of the hexagon. 
This gives the volume of oil-bearing sands 
in that column, and the summation of the 
values of all columns is thus the estimate 
of the total volume of the reservoir sands. 
Measuring the bulk volume of  a reservoir 
Wall et al challenge our calculations of the volumes of oil in place and 
of oil recoverable from the reservoirs. They state that it is 'impossible 
for his IOdell and Rosing's] model to generate production figures 
greater than the company estimates') They fail, however, to present 
any evidence to justify their categorical statement. Unfortunately, 
Wall et al are again mistaken, for our model is able to produce higher 
recoverable reserves and higher production figures than those 
reported by the companies, because the bulk volumes of the reservoirs 
which we calculate from the evidence publicly available is greater 
than those indicated by the operators. 9 Their failure lies in their simple 
acceptance, without 'the most elementary of routine checks', ~° of the 
volumes announced by the companies f(~r their fields. 
Wall et al explain quite clearly the nt~rmal text-book method of 
volumetrically estimating oil in place ttnd recoverable reserves, which 
presumably is used by their former colleagues in the oil companies. 
But they omit one important point in their summary of that 
methodology - the method used to convert planimetered areas to 
volumes. Craft and Hawkins cover this point very clearly. 11 
This method, however, inevitably results in underestimation f the 
bulk volume, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Our method 12 (Figure 2) 
provides a more accurate stimate of the true overall volume of the 
reservoir ock, though it should be noted that there is still an error 
because it is necessary to assume that each area A in Figure 2 is equal 
to the corresponding area B. This is not true, but the error introduced 
is very small and the error is, moreover, distributed both positively 
and negatively around the true value so that, in the field overall, the 
net error is likely to be of little significance. 
Compared with this accurate method of measurement, Wall et al 
chose to employ an inherently less accurate method in which, as 
shown, there is an inevitable underestimation f the bulk volume. The 
degree of their conservatism will be a function of the configuration of 
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Figure 1. Area of o i l -bear ing sands 
calculated by p lan imetry  
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l Mid - points of columns 
~3 BP could not or would not give us such 
information. 
14 Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, pp 60, 
66, and 107. 
the reservoir (in its three dimensions) and of the contour interval 
chosen for the calculations. The interpolation method must always 
produce higher estimates of reservoir sand volume (and of stocktank 
oil in place and of recoverable oil, when using identical porosity and 
permeability characteristics) than the methods used by Wall et al and 
by the oil companies (if they indeed use the methods described by our 
critics), simply because our method more faithfully represents reality. 
The differences for the Forties field are shown below. 
Volumetric alculations for the Forties field 
Table 1 shows volumetric alculations for the Forties field calculated 
in four different ways. Comparison of columns 3 and 4 indicates the 
significant magnitude (about 17% in this case) of the inevitable 
underestimate obtained by using Wall et al's method, while the values 
which they quote (column 1) are another 19% less than those in 
column 3. This latter difference may well arise because of the 
introduction at this stage of a variable (not publicly available) in the 
calculations of the volume of producing sands, ie the specific ratio of 
net to gross volume of producing sands in the particular reservoir. As 
indicated above, there was (and is) no publicly available information 
on the net:gross and ratio for the Forties field) 3 Although we 
mentioned the importance of this variable in reservoir calculations, ~4
we were unable to incorporate it specifically in our analysis. Various 
allowances were made in our monograph calculations for factors 
reducing the producibility of the reservoir, including the net:gross 
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a Based on the planimetered contours. 
Our planimetry was done on a Science 
Accessories Corporation Model GP/3 
backing up an IMLAC PDS/4 digitizing 
table with a resolution of 0 .05 mm. A 
scale of 1 in corresponding to 1.43 miles 
was used, and the calculations were 
performed by systems software on the 
Hewlett-Packard 2200 system which 
backs up the SAC-GP/3. A video display 
was generated and used to verify the 
accuracy of the line trace. Areas should 
be accurate to + 1.7%. 
b The 'true volume' calculations 
consisted of generating a full three 
dimensional view of the field via the 
equipment described above, and 
integrating the volume. 
c Calculated from figures in the lines 
below. 
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Table 1. Volumetric analysis of the Forties field 
Wall et al 
from BP 
Volume of (3729) c 
sands 
(million m 3 ) 
Stock tank 4400 





Wall et al Odell and Rosing Odell and 
from Odell following Well et al's Rosing's true 
and directions a volume 
Rosi ng method b 
(5377) c 4755 5751 
6345 5611 6786 
2538 2244 2714 
15 Note, however, that Wall et al seem to 
be happy to accept a figure which 
underestimates the size of the reservoir 
by no less than 17%. We would argue 
that their presentation is much more 
seriously in error in its volumetric 
calculations than was our original 
overestimate. 
le Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, p 96. 
17 We have now discussed this point fully 
with petroleum geologists and reservoir 
engineers in both the US and the 
Canadian Geological Surveys. These 
offices are intensively involved in off- 
shore assessment and development 
regulation. Without exception these 
experts in the application of Wall et afs 
discipline to offshore conditions reject 
Wall et ars view and agree with ours. 
(Discussions held on 24 March 1977, 
Office of Energy Resources, Reston, 
Virginia, and on 19 July 1977, Office of 
Non-Renewable Resources, Ottawa, 
Ontario.) 
ratio, but if we are now correct in assuming that Wall et al's 19% 
reduction (the difference between columns 1 and 3 in Table 1) is 
entirely due to the difference between gross and net sands' volume, 
then we have overestimated the size of the recoverable reserves by 
about 12%. ~5 
Nevertheless, even if we accept that Figure 8-13 in our 
monograph ~6 overstates the values by at most 12%, so that each 
curve in that graph should be lowered by at most that amount, the 
shape of the curve is not affected and the argument presented remains 
unaltered by the minor recalculation necessary to adjust our reservoir 
size calculations to take full note of the non-producing sands in the 
Forties field. 
On producing an oil6eld 
Wall et al argue that the more intensive field development schemes we 
investigated inevitably mean over-drilling and over-investment, and 
they imply that the less intensive field development schemes will, in 
any case, produce as much oil. The crucial point is the spatial 
coverage of a field which can be achieved by a specific number of 
wells and platforms. We have discussed this point with other reservoir 
engineers, 17 and they agree with our interpretation of terms such as 
'average well spacing' and 'platform draw areas'. We took these to 
define the portion of a field which can be depleted by wells drilled by 
deviated drilling from platforms, given that there is a 'normal draw 
area per well' in respect of the volume of the sands that can thus be 
depleted in an economically relevant time period. 
This is entirely different from simply drilling more wells in areas 
which can already be served by existing wells, as Wall et al imply we 
suggested - and which they indicated would mean a repetition of 
earlier 'mistakes' in depleting reservoirs in the USA. In the context of 
the North Sea's development, their reference to previous US 
experience is totally fallacious. That experience related to 
developments for which oilfield management was primitive, and where 
regimes of pressure maintenance were established only near the end of 
the fields' lives because of ownership problems as well as undeveloped 
technology. In those circumstances there was over-drilling and over- 
exploitation of reservoirs, leading to low ultimate recovery rates. Such 
experience is entirely irrelevant to the managerial, physical and 
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18 Reported in The Economist, 5 February 
1977, p 90. 
19 LASMO's share offer document, July 
1977 (authors' italics). 
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technological conditions that prevail in the North Sea province. 
There is also a major difference, in economic terms, between the 
development of onshore and offshore fields. In developing an onshore 
field a company is committed only to the cost of drilling each well (or 
perhaps a small group of wells) in turn. In deep-water offshore 
developments (as in the North Sea), the company has to commit itself 
to the cost of installing a platform from which to drill, the cost of 
which is virtually the same whether it is used for one well or for 27 as 
in the Forties field. This 'lumpiness' in the investment required for 
developing an off-shore field creates a very different economic 
environment. Indeed, it dictates a different set of considerations for 
evaluating the physical development process. 
The spatial coverage problem 
We maintain that the spatial coverage of an offshore field achieved 
using the production system initially determined for installation is one 
of the most critical variables in the production regime for that field. 
Increasing the portion of  the field covered by platforms (by adding 
platforms to the production system) will normally increase the 
economically recoverable reserves of a field: when what is 'economic' 
depends upon the timing of  production. 
This is clearly recognized by oil companies. Chevron, for example, 
have announced that the addition of a third platform to the producing 
system they are to install on the Ninian field increases the recoverable 
reserves of that field from 850 million bbl to 1100 million bbl. ~8 This 
must be due mainly to the fact that the portion of the field which can 
be covered by the platforms to be placed on the field has been 
increased. There is no other change which could account for the 
magnitude of increase in the reserves' estimates. A recent report on 
the Ninian field has been even more specific both on the additional 
platform and the additional wells on the field: 
The planned evelopment scheme for the Ninian Field in October 1975 included 
two platforms, one in the central and one in the southern portion of the field. 
Because the reservoir is more narrow in the northern portion, the use of a third 
platform has been evaluated based on the economics of recovering more oil in less 
time ... There have been several changes in the [production] limiting factors ince 
the last report, causing significantly higher maximum production rates. Tubing size 
has been increased ... the capacity of the oil processing facilities was increased and 
five more wells are added to the Northern platform ... These changes resulted in a 
faster production rate build-up and much higher maximum daily rates of oil 
production. 19 
Amoco has made much the same point in writing to us about various 
possible production schemes for draining a hypothetical field. Figure 
3 was appended to the following Amoco description of  the economics 
of recovering the reserves of  a field with various faults: 
It shows the existence of faults serving to rule out a natural water drive .., In an 
effort o enjoy higher ecovery through water flooding, the operator would seek to 
inject water into the reservoir but ... the result would be limited by the number of 
available well slots (on the platform) and the ability of the operator accurately to 
identify and locate the various fault traps and to penetrate them with both an 
injection well and one or more producing wells (thus the undrained areas on the 
field as shown). This illustrates the not uncommon situation whereby a field which 
almost justified two platforms at the outset but which was developed initially with 
only one platform ... this would in effect rule out the possibility of the second 
platform at a later date ... for by locating the first platform right in the middle of 
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One platform - 12 production wells, 5 injection wells 
F3 F4 F5 
F2 ". ". "o 
~ .. f : . . . .~~' .  , - - - - - -%~ 
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Two platforms - 12 production wells, 6 injection wells 
F1 
F2 F3 F4 F5 
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• o °.o • • 
Figure 3. Recoverable reserve 
(economic) as determined by fault 
pattern and/or initial development 
scheme 
• Production well . . . . . . .  Fault 
O Injection well ":':':':':':':': ii::i:r!i!i!i!ii::i Undrained areas 
[ ]  Platform ~ Field boundary 
(closing contour) 
z0 Letter from AMOCO (UK) Ltd to the 
authors, July 1975. 
the deposit none of the edge areas in this are big enough to support a second 
platform. With better economics (higher prices, lower taxes?) at the outset, two 
platforms towards the extremes of the field area might have been justified by a 
higher reserve. 2° 
From this description of the physical characteristics of off-shore 
reservoirs and the economics of their producing systems, Amoco (as 
with Chevron) seems to think that more platforms and more wells 
give more coverage and more recoverable r serves. 
The technical iterature contains many oblique references to this 
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21Noroi l ,  Vol 4, No 10, October 1976, p 
80. 
22 Discussions between BP and the 
authors, February 1976. 
z3 Wall et al, op cit, Ref 1, p 284, line 24. 
z4 More strictly speaking, the production 
system selected is the one that enables 
the company concerned to achieve the 
minimum acceptable rate of return on 
investment - in the light of all competing 
opportunities. 
zs Wall et al, op cit, Ref 1, p 287, lines 29-  
30. 
26 Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, pp 77, 
107, and 131. 
27 Wall et al, op cit, Ref 1, p 286, lines 41 - 
42, p 287, lines 29-30, and p 289, lines 
5-6. 
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central problem of spatial coverage. The exploration director of CFP 
is reported by Noroil  as saying that 'Alwyn's oil reserves were 
insufficient o warrant the use of several production platforms, but a 
single platform would not be capable of bringing out enough oil from 
the field'. 2! 
Finally, it also seems worth recording that in our discussions with 
British Petroleum on the spatial coverage problem, there was such 
interest in the analytical methodology we were talking about that BP's 
spokesman suggested that we should be given - in confidence - the 
necessary reservoir data on a field, which at that time (February 
1976) had not been publicly announced, to see what solution we could 
reach in respect of the economics of its producibility by one, two or 
more platform systems. Again, the company concerned appeared to 
think that the spatial coverage problem is one of importance in 
determining recoverable reserves over economically relevant time 
periods. 22 
Other criticisms 
We have identified the major errors, misunderstandings and 
misleading elements in the engineering part of Wall et al's article. 
There are other points in their criticism which seem irrelevant, 
inconsistent or mistaken. 
Wall et al state that we recommend irect government investment 
for developing a field 23 - this is not so. What we do recommend is a 
more flexible governmental policy for fields being developed, 
modifying the economic environment within which the companies 
operate, to encourage a more complete development of the field which 
would still be profitable to the operating company. At present, 
inflexible government policy on royalties and taxes leads companies 
to plan the development that is likely to maximize their profits after 
tax - with the tax being taken as a fixed element in their cost 
evaluations. 24 This approach appears to limit the total planned 
recovery from a field to less than that which is technically 
recoverable. In one of our examples, the mechanism investigated for 
engendering overnmental encouragement of the field's development 
was direct investment, but other strategies, uch as modified taxation 
policy and loan guarantees, to achieve optimal development of a field, 
were also presented. 
According to Wall et al our definition of the drainage area of wells 
is arbitrary. 25 This is untrue, however, for we assigned the well 
drainage areas either on the basis of information on this variable as 
published by the appropriate operating company (for Forties and 
Montrose), or from estimates we made from the indirect evidence in 
the literature (in the case of the Piper Field). 26 
Wall et a! state that the term (1-Sw)/B can be estimated from 
published data, and state that our incorrect estimates of it are 
responsible for the 'error' in our calculations of recoverable oi l .  27 For 
the Forties field we have an estimate which is certainly within the 
error of the value they give (0.70 compared with 0.67). In the case of 
Montrose, it would appear that they have misinterpreted our 
statement of the term. The factor they quote from our study should 
not be 0.65, but 1.00 - 0.65 = 0.35; this again is well within the 
error of the term, which they give as 0.30. They do not mention our 
estimate for the Piper field - why not? Is our estimate again accurate 
within the error of the (still publicly unknown) value estimated by the 
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operating company? They then fault us because the operating 
companies have, on producing the reservoirs, discovered that they are 
producing better than their estimates of (1-Sw)/B led them to 
expect. 28 Our model had to be calibrated from the data as published 
by the operators up to the summer of 1976, and it was within the 
framework of this data that we tried to simulate the information 
environment within which the companies' production decisions were 
made. If it has now been demonstrated that fewer wells are necessary 
to produce certain quantities of oil than the companies originally 
estimated, then the average well spacing could have been greater than 
they originally expected. This revised view of the situation is totally 
external to our work, and if there has to be criticism of production 
estimates then it has to be of those made by the operators. It cannot 
be criticism of our work, which could only be based on what the 
companies had publicly reported at the time we were attempting to 
simulate the fields' development. With better data we could have more 
effectively calibrated our model. 
Wall et al's general approach on reservoir engineering 
One aspect of Wall et al's criticism of our study is in one way more 
important han all the substantive matters with which we have dealt 
above. There are no citations or literature references in the 
engineering section of their article.* For example, they do not cite the 
publication(s) which contain the information from which ( I -S~) /B  
can be calculated. They expect he reader simply to accept hat such 
publications exist. Nor do they provide any citation or other 
indication of the performance of their calculations, but merely present 
the reader with the result. 
The principle basis of the scientific method is replicability, but as 
Wall et al do not produce the evidence on which they base their work, 
it is impossible for another scholar to duplicate or analyse the bases of 
their criticism. The reader is continually expected to accept 
statements for which there is no collaborative evidence. This 
approach would seem to violate the most basic principle of publishing 
in any academic discipline, including, we are sure, their own discipline 
of reservoir engineering. Their closest approximation of a citation is 
'BP estimate', 29expressed in various ways. Other esoteric items of 
factual knowledge lack even this sort of prosaic reference! 
We are criticized for our lack of academic rigourfl ° but we at least 
give the reader the opportunity of verifying or of refuting our results, 
through explanation, accreditation and citation - that is, by adhering 
to the rules of academic publishing. Wall et al's article comprises only 
unsubstantiated personal opinion. For this reason alone their paper is 
unworthy of consideration even had we not shown that many of their 
arguments are erroneous or false. 
* Editor 's  note:  We included a reference 
to Odell and Rosing's monograph in Wall 
et al's article after this rejoinder by Odell 
and Rosing was completed and submitted 
to us. 
z8/bid, p 288, lines 36-48. 
a9/bid, p 288, line 39, 
30 Ibid,  pp 284, 294. 
31 Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, p 174. 
Economic aspects 
We can agree on one item in the economics ection of Wall et al's 
article - their final comment that public attention and debate in 
respect of the economics of North Sea oil need to be stimulated. This 
was the prime motivation to publish our monograph which, we 
concluded, 'may perhaps have indicated an approach which can 
achieve the reconciliation of the conflicting interest of state and oil 
companies'2 ~ However, Wall et al's contribution to this important 
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32 Ibid, p 72. 
33 Moreover,  we tested the impact of 
varying the rate of inflation in the range 3- 
15% per annum in the case of the Piper 
field. This sensitivity analysis (carried out 
on no fewer  than 7 variables and on a 
worst  case/best case combination) was 
described in Chapter 1 1 of our  study. As 
Figure 1 1-2 shows (Odell and Rosing, op 
cit, Ref 2, p 162), the results were very 
insensitive to variations in inflation rate. 
34 Odell and Rosing, op cit, Ref 2, p 71. 
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debate is entirely negative, and its somewhat intemperate one smacks 
more of the familiar propaganda that 'what is right for the companies 
must be right for the community' than it does of any wish to continue 
the search for the truth. 
The detailed criticisms 
Our capital costs estimates did not disregard inflation, as Wall et al 
claimed. We did not consider that anyone could fail to recognize the 
need for incorporating rising prices into the costs of North Sea 
installations, so we did not think it necessary to spell this out. 
however, it can clearly be seen to be incorporated in our inputs, for 
example in Table 7-132 which shows capital costs of the various 
platforms on the Forties field. Early-period installations (including 
pipeline costs) are each about $300 million (a figure based on the 
published ata for platform installation in 1975-6). For the fifth, sixth 
and seventh platforms (in the systems with a larger number of 
platforms, so involving platforms which are built and installed up to 
several years later than the early ones), the capital costs per platform 
range from $450 to $535 million. 
We chose three specific cases dealing with the future price of oil 
and inflation rate. Our base case, with 10% per annum inflation and a 
$12.50 per barrel oil price in 1975 rising by $0.50 cents per annum, is 
not a prophecy - it is the kind of reasonable guess that all investors 
have to make about the future behaviour of the economic system 
relevant to their interests. In early discussions of our work with 
British Petroleum, we found that these figures for inflation rate and 
price of oil were close to their best guesses for movements in the two 
variables. Since then (1975), the two variables have, indeed, moved 
roughly in line with these base case figures. The assumption that 
running costs increase proportionately more quickly than oil price is, 
of course, related partly to the fact that the former is a function of 
rising British costs (with its higher than average inflation) while the 
latter is a reflection of OPEC's reaction to the overall change in 
international price levels. 33 
We stated specifically 34 that there are many sophisticated theorems 
for finding the right discount rate to evaluate past, present and future 
revenue and expenditure flows. This, of course, is necessary so that 
one can realistically model the way a company looks at the 
opportunity cost of its investment in general, as well as the way in 
which it takes into account he 'specific risk' of developing the North 
Sea's potential. The method we chose was certainly not related to the 
Dow Jones or the Financial Times indexes, as Wall et al seem to 
imply, but was related to the unique circumstances of the alternative 
investment decisions that can be taken for developing North Sea 
oilfields. At the time that the development decision on a field has to be 
taken, the availability of information on the existence and 
recoverability of oil varies spatially (because of the limited nature of 
the field exploration programme that can be undertaken in the 
evaluation stage). In such circumstances, a company can only equate 
the commercial validity of the most certain, the less certain, and the 
least certain flows of oil from the field (by means of possible 
alternative production systems) by varying the discount rate it uses 
for measuring the return on geographically discrete 'lumps' of 
investment. These separate 'lumps' then aggregate in different ways to 
define a series of systems of varying cost and of varying productivity. 
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As Wall et al point out, the oil company may undertake a variety of 
projects, all with independent risks. However, rather than risk 
averaging - which implies taking on some high risk projects - the 
company selects those projects with a high potential pay-off. Varying 
the discount rates to include the increasing risk in developing a field 
more intensively allows the study of these alternatives. 
The literature on the choice of discount rates did not appear to us 
to have considered this situation, and the cases quoted by Wall et al 
are quite irrelevant. We are still very much open to persuasion on the 
methodology we used (and on the appropriate way to combine the 
discount rates for different platforms in the same system - for which, 
incidentally, our most extensive range for various platform systems 
was 15-26.5%, not 15-45% as Wall et al erroneously indicated) but 
the criticisms here are entirely unhelpful and mistaken. Wall et al 
simply forgot - or failed to understand - that we are dealing with 
alternatives of 1, 2, 3, ... N platform systems, and not with 
incremental additions to a single system. We did, incidentally, also 
test the sensitivity of variation in the relative risk assessment by about 
20% around the base case value. This resulted in changes in the 
present values of the two- and three-platform systems on the Piper 
field (the inputs for which were used for the sensitivity analysis), but it 
did not alter the shape of the curves. 35 
Wall et al consider that we chose a 'wrong' figure for the cost of 
government borrowing. They use the extraordinary argument that 
because we worked in dollars we should have related the test discount 
rate to the cost of government borrowing in the US capital market. 36 
Any such calculation would, in the circumstances of 1975-76 (when 
we did the work), also have had to take near-future xpectations of 
adverse changes in the $/£ exchange rate into account. This is exactly 
the same variable that was then expressed, through the financial 
market, by the difference at that time between the 12% government 
borrowing rate in the UK and lower borrowing rates in the USA. 
3s Ib id ,  Figure 4, p 164. 
3eWe used this mode of expression 
simply because this is the way costs and 
prices in the oil industry are usually 
expressed. 
The general issues 
The first of these is the differential between private and public money 
and between private and public risk in investment decisions. Wall et al 
seem to believe that the world's financial markets are perfectly 
competitive with no institutional, geographical, or political 
constraints. Thus, all parties have an identical opportunity cost of 
capital in all circumstances, with variations only over time as the 
'invisible hand' tugs the strings of the puppet actors up and down. 
Wall et al must surely be aware of the fallacy of this too simplistic 
view of the operation of the international financing system. 
Opportunity costs vary even between international companies, 
because there are constraints that are peculiar to some decision 
makers but not to others (a factor we described in our analysis of the 
Piper field, which is being developed by a consortium of companies 
whose economic behaviour is, and must be, very different from that of 
BP, the sole developer of the Forties field). They vary even more 
between companies which operate internationally and those with 
purely national interests. They vary most between major international 
oil companies (with their ability to rank their investment priorities 
against opportunities existing in many countries and in many 
circumstances) and national governments (whose investment 
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opportunities are limited, by and large, to developments in their own 
national territories). 
In the North Sea the oil companies can (and must) test the validity 
of their additional investment opportunity against alternative claims 
for their money provided by investment opportunities in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Gulf of Thailand, or the North West Australian Shelf, or 
against opportunities for investing in coal mines in South Africa, 
open-cast coal mining in Sumatra, or shale oil developments in the 
USA. Given such a plethora of investment opportunities, a minimum 
internal rate of return of 25% is demanded for all lumps of investment 
by such companies and, in present circumstances, the minimum 
acceptable rate may be as high as 40%. The UK government, on the 
other hand, does not have many chances to invest in ventures with 
high rates of return. Even if they were available, any UK government 
would also have to consider their employment, balance of payments, 
social welfare, and political and strategic implications. The public 
would not wish its security and future to be put at stake by a 
government deciding that investment in 'candy floss' production, with 
a possible rate of return of 20% is 'better' for the country than 
investment in off-shore oil, deep-mined coal, or nuclear power stations 
from which 20% returns are more difficult to generate. Our study 
showed that the UK government can make acceptable 'rates of 
return' on 'investing' money in the North Sea, if it can persuade 
companies to push the development of an oilfield beyond the strictly 
commercial limit (when 'acceptable' is defined as a rate which exceeds 
its costs of medium-term borrowing). Such opportunities for 
government interests in oil developments do appear to be more 
favourable than most current alternatives open to the government in
other parts of the energy sector of the economy. For example, nuclear 
power stations barely 'pay out' with a 9-10% cost, and, from 
calculations we have made recently, it seems that the best that can be 
expected from the investment of over £400 million in the Selby 
coalfield is a return of 15.3%. This would hardly be an investment 
opportunity of interest o any international oil company, but would 
Wall et al suggest hat it should not, therefore, be undertaken, given 
what they and all of us know about the uncertainties of the world's 
energy supply in the 1980s and the 1990s. Such considerations mean 
that there must be investment now in energy producing potential by 
any government with the longer-term interests of the nation at heart. 
We are also taken to task by Wall et al on the question of speed of 
development of the UK's oil resources for allegedly advocating their 
accelerated production. We did no such thing, but indeed dealt 
specifically with the issue in Chapter 5 on 'Policy implications': 
We ... accept hat a country may wish to prevent the discovery or the development 
of a field or fields because it wishes to save the potential reserves for the future. 37 
This is an issue which can perhaps be resolved by the 'full 
cost-benefit analysis of government policy' which Wall et al say is 
needed. But our study was not directly concerned with that issue. 
Instead, we tried to evaluate the significance of contrasting rates of 
production from individual fields, and we showed how the 
government can benefit by getting more oil more quickly out of each 
field in return for creating conditions in which the most intensive and 
extensive production system is also profitable enough for the oil 
company concerned. If it does this with each field which is to be 
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developed, then the government enhances, rather than reduces, its 
opportunities to consider the question of the overall 'best' rate at 
which the North Sea's reserves hould be produced. If one or more 
field(s) can be developed so as to produce 20% or 50% more oil over 
the next 15 years, and this higher rate of production then satisfies the 
government's evaluated need of the total amount of oil the country 
'ought' to produce, then the potential for oil production from other 
fields can be saved for the future. If, on the other hand, each company 
decides for itself what part of a reservoir it shall develop only in 
relation to a rate of return which it finds acceptable vis-d-vis 
alternative opportunities, then the country risks having all its lowest 
production cost fields only half-depleted in the short term, so opening 
up dangers for the supply and price of oil in the UK over the longer 
term. There is a real conflict of interest here which can only be 
avoided by the reconciliation which remains to be worked out 
between government and companies for the benefit of the society at 
large. The issue is important - perhaps even critical - to the UK's 
development s rategy, and we hope the debate will be continued. 
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